Specialist on Soviet and Russian security affairs

The Globe and Mail (Canada)

December 12, 2007

Monday's surprise announcement by Russian President Vladimir Putin of his candidate for the country's presidency in next March's election solves the mystery of who will be Mr. Putin's designated successor. But his choice of First Deputy Premier Dmitry Medvedev by no means ensures a peaceful succession process.

The nomination comes at a time when infighting between two Kremlin clans has become particularly fierce and several high-level officials have been arrested on charges of corruption. Mr. Putin suggested on Monday that Mr. Medvedev was a leader who could establish a "stable government." But the Putin protégé has been a behind-the-scenes participant in these conflicts that centre on the distribution of political power and control over the Kremlin's vast economic resources. Despite his reputation as "moderate," Mr. Medvedev's nomination will do little to quell these factional wars.

President Putin has apparently tried to mediate among the warring clans. But by announcing an heir apparent and making his own political plans unclear, Mr. Putin is taking a gamble, despite the affirmation of his popularity in last week's parliamentary election that gave his United Russia party a resounding victory.

Most observers assume that Mr. Putin will have de facto rule over the Kremlin after Mr. Medvedev, is "elected." Mr. Medvedev, a Putin loyalist from St. Petersburg, can be counted on to pursue the policies of his predecessor. He even suggested yesterday that Mr. Putin could be his prime minister. But the Russian political system, with authority centralized in the office of the president, is not geared for a dual-power arrangement.

Despite his young age and low public profile, the 42-year-old Mr. Medvedev had long been mentioned as a possible candidate to succeed Mr. Putin. But many observers had speculated that the other first deputy prime minister, the more "hard-line" former KGB officer Sergei Ivanov, who is not closely associated with either of the warring clans, might be given the nod.

The fact that Mr. Putin kept everyone, including many in the Kremlin itself, guessing as to what his plans were, suggests that he was worried that his choice of a successor might not be well received by some of his key Kremlin supporters.

With good reason. Although Mr. Medvedev himself does not have a career background in the KGB, he is allied with one of the two main feuding Kremlin factions that are both dominated by officials from the security services and law enforcement agencies - the so-called siloviki. Mr. Medvedev's endorsement by Mr. Putin represents a grave threat to members of the opposing clan, led by Mr. Putin's deputy chief of staff Igor Sechin. These people won't yield without a struggle.

Mr. Medvedev, who was awarded, in 2000, the chairmanship of Gazprom, the enormous state-controlled gas corporation, has long had a rivalry with Mr. Sechin, chairman of the state-owned oil giant Rosneft. (Mr. Medvedev tried unsuccessfully to have Gazprom take control of Rosneft in 2003.) Mr. Sechin, who engineered the attack against another oil giant, Yukos, is supported by Mr. Putin's old KGB comrade Nikolai Patrushev, chief of the Federal Security Service (FSB).

In September, Mr. Sechin and Mr. Patrushev managed to undercut the authority of the prosecutor-general, Yuri Chaika (who had charged high-ranking FSB officials with corruption) by creating a new investigative committee with sweeping powers. Together with the FSB, the committee carried out a series of highly publicized arrests among officials in the Federal Drug Control Service, which is headed by Mr. Patrushev's arch-rival, Viktor Cherkesov, another old Putin comrade from the KGB.

Mr. Cherkesov responded with an impassioned protest in the business press and brought forward a businessman who claimed the Sechin group gave him orders to reprivatize state assets.

Then, two weeks ago, the investigative committee and the FSB imprisoned deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak, who oversees Russia's $144-billion oil stabilization fund, on charges of embezzlement. Mr. Storchak's boss, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin vehemently protested the arrest, and prosecutor Chaika rescinded one of the charges. The investigative committee is contesting the decision.

Although Mr. Medvedev has not openly taken sides in this conflict, he is responsible, as deputy premier, for relations between the government and the prosecutor's office, so he cannot avoid getting involved. Given his rivalry with Mr. Sechin and his close relations with Finance Minister Kudrin, he is more than likely backing the Cherkesov-Chaika faction.

Mr. Medvedev's nomination for the presidency could explain the rumours that Igor Sechin, himself, has been placed under "cabinet arrest," with no access to official documents, and that FSB chief Patrushev is about to be replaced by Mr. Cherkesov. If true, there could be a temporary halt to the Kremlin conflicts. But Mr. Sechin and Mr. Patrushev represent powerful interest groups, that might well attempt to derail Mr. Medvedev's candidacy.

Just last month, in an interview with foreign journalists Mr. Medvedev observed that corruption charges can easily serve political purposes: "Nothing irritates an average person more than outrageous facts of officials taking bribes," he said. "It always sits well in people's heads and can be used in a political struggle."

In the next few months, Mr. Medvedev, who, given his prominence in entrepreneurial ventures, doubtless has some skeletons in his own closet, may well become a victim of the very tactics he described.